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DEREGULATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION: 
THE INDONESIAN B.EFORK PB.OGRAM 
by 
Scott W. Fausti and Rony Bishry 
ABSTRACT 
Beginning in the early 1980s, Indonesia embarked on the most comprehensive 
trade liberalization program in its history. The long-term goal of the reform 
program is to replace Indonesia's industrial development strategy of import 
substitution industrialization with one of export oriented industrial growth. 
The issues to be discussed in this paper are: 1) the historical context from 
which the current liberalization program evolved, 2) the recent reform measures 
implemented by the Indonesian government, 3) the pattern of liberalization with 
respect to the sequencing and speed of reforms, and 4) the successes and failures 
of the new trade regime. 
DEB..EG'CJLA.TION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION: 
TBE INDONESIAN :UP'ORK PB.OGB.All 
I. Introduction 
To appreciate the present initiative of the Indonesian government to 
deregulate and liberalize the Indonesian economy, one should consider the present 
efforts at reform within an historical context. Since independence, the 
Indonesian economy has gone through five distinct phases, roughly delineated by 
the years 1950-57, 1958-65, 1966-71, 1972-1982, and 1983 to the present. 1 The 
first two phases spanned a period of rising nationalist sentiment against foreign 
influence. This nationalistic fervor helped advance a government policy of 
import substitution and self sufficiency. During this period the Indonesian 
government, for the most part, followed an inward looking development strategy 
which relied on government intervention in the private sector and state 
enterprises. Industrial development was promoted at the expense of agriculture 
and the economic development programs implemented by the government had little 
success. Consequently, the economy stagnated while fiscal and monetary policy 
mismanagement pushed the inflation rate into triple digits. 
In September of 1965, a new government came to power as a result of a 
failed coup. In 1966, a program of macro economic stabilization and trade 
liberalization was instituted. The liberalization program focused on stimulating 
private sector investment and de-emphasized government investment initiatives. 
Passage of the Foreign Investment Law (1967) and the Domestic Investment Law 
(1968) created a package of fiscal and tariff incentives that spurred new 
investment in the private sector. In 1969, the Indo Rupiah was made fully 
1See Pitt (1981) for a detailed discussion of the first four 
phases. 
convertible. In August 1971, Indonesia pegged its exchange rate to the U. S. 
dollar and eliminated virtually all government restrictions on capital movements. 
In November of 1978, the Indonesian government ended the rupiah-dollar link in 
favor of a managed float exchange rate policy. 
These reforms helped to increase average annual real GDP growth from 1. 7% 
in the 1960-66 period to 7. 6% in the 1967-73 period, while reducing the rate of 
inflation from 85% in 1968 to 6. 4% in 1972. 2 However, the government continued 
its policy of import substitution, favoring the import competing sector over the 
export sector. Evidence of disproportional protection during this period is 
provided by Pitt (1981) . 3 Pitt calculated the 1971 average effective protection 
rates (ERP) and found that Indonesia's import competing sector ERP to be 66% and 
the export sector ERP to be -11%. 4 
The 1972-82 era was marked by raising protectionist barriers. A 
complicated system of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTB) evolved. These NTB 
included an import licensing system, quotas, import bans, and various informal 
quantitative restrictions. Informal quantitative restrictions took the form of 
complex port and customs clearance procedures. It is the general conclusion of 
economists that this strategy was counter productive; fostering a number of high 
2Data on and discussion of Indonesian macro economic 
performance during this period can be found on Booth (1992) and 
Warr (1992). 
3See Pitt (1981), p. 208. 
4The effective rate of protection is the percentage increase 
in value added resulting from the assistance structure. It 
therefore measures net assistance by taking into account input 
assistance (e.g. subsidies) and input penalties (e.g. tariffs) on 
the activities inputs. 
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cost, inefficient industries at the expense of more efficient labor intensive 
final product industries and reduced non-oil exports. 5 
The problems that usually accompany this type of trade regime, such as a 
balance of payment deficit and/or government budget deficit were alleviated by 
the rapid increase in world oil prices during this period. During the 1972-82 
period, Indonesia became increasingly dependent on oil exports for tax revenues. 
In 1969 80% of tax revenue was derived from non-oil sources; by 1981, the 
proportion had declined to 27%. 6 'When world demand for oil decreased in the 
early 1980s, the price of oil collapsed. The decline in export tax revenue led 
to a widening trade and budget deficit for Indonesia. Faced with financial 
crisis, the government retreated further from the gains attained through trade 
liberalization (1966�71) and began to restrict imports. It was during this 
period, however, that deregulation of the financial sector of the economy began. 9 
In 1983, the rupiah was devalued, and in 1984 tax reform laws were passed. 
As import restrictions tightened, a debate arose over the wisdom of 
continuing to support an import substitution industrialization policy. 7 
Economists argued that the potential gains from this policy had been exhausted 
and it was time to begin the transition to an export oriented trade regime and 
emulate the success of the other Pacific Rim nations. 
In 1985 it had finally become clear to Indonesian government officials that 
the inward looking bias of their trade regime had created a high cost economy 
vulnerable to macro economic instability driven by fluctuations in world oil 
5A aore detailed discussion can be found in a study by the 
World Bank (1988b), pp. 56-58. 
6Asher and Booth (1992), p. 49. 
7For a detailed discussion of deregulation of the financial 
sector in Indonesia during this period see Cole and Slade (1992). 
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prices. 8 The resulting economic instability impaired the government's ability 
to meet its general economic goals of promoting 1) economic growth, 2) 
employment, 3) income, and 4) greater equity in income distribution. 
II. Deregulation and Trade Liberalization: Indonesia in the 1980a 
The most extensive trade liberalization program in Indonesian history was 
initiated in March of 1985. The long-term goal of the reform program was to 
reverse Indonesian industrial development strategy from import substitution 
industrialization to export oriented industrial growth. Between March of 1985 
and May of 1990, 22 major reform measures were implemented to liberalize 
Indonesia's trade regime and further deregulate the financial and real 
(production) sectors of the economy. 9 A brief outline of the major reform 
measures is given below. 
In March of 1985, the government began a comprehensive reform of the tariff 
schedule. 10 The tariff ceiling was reduced from 225% to 60% and the number of 
tariff categories was reduced from 25 to 11. The reforms reduced the proportion 
of imports subject to tariff rates greater than 30% from 41% to 18%. However, 
the effectiveness of this reform was partially offset by the increased use of 
import licensing restrictions. 
In April of 1985, the government completely reorganized the customs, ports, 
and shipping operation procedures in order to remove informal quantitative 
8A detailed discussion of the debate can be found in the paper 
by M. Hadi Soesastro (1989). 
9For a discussion of the impact world oil price instability 
had on the Indonesian economy during the 1970s and 1980s, see Warr 
(1992). 
10A complete description of the reform measures can be found 
in GATT's Trade Policy Review: Indonesia 1991, Vol I. 
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restrictions to trade .11 In May of 1986, the government implemented reform 
measures to reduce the use of import licensing restrictions. In January of 1987, 
the government instituted adjustments in tariffs and surcharges to compensate 
domestic producers for the removal of import licensing restrictions. In December 
of 1987, the government removed or simplified the regulations directly affecting 
exporters. In October of 1988, further deregulation of the financial sector was 
implemented with a sweeping reform of the banking system. In November, the 
government replaced NTB on 301 items with tariffs. In December, private 
securities markets were established. In January of 1989, the Harmonized System 
of Trade Classification replaced the CCCN system. In May of 1990, 374 NTB were 
abolished and tariffs on 2363 items were lowered.12 Indonesia has made great 
progress in both restructuring its economy and fulfilling its commitments to GATT 
and ASEAN through its liberalization program. Before October 1986, 32% of all 
import items, representing 41% of total domestic production, were subject to 
import licensing restrictions. By December of 1990, import licensing 
restrictions were reduced to 14% of all items imported; representing 25% of total 
domestic production (see table I). 
The reduction in NTB restrictions allows tariffs to play the major role in 
determining the level and pattern of imports. Tariff rates in 1990 are applied 
on an "most favored nation" (m.f.n.) basis to over 90% of the total value of 
Indonesian imports. The average m.f.n. tariff rate in 1990 has been lowered to 
22% (simple average), down from 37% in 1984 (see tables II & 111).13 
11World Bank (1988b), p. 58. 
12World Bank (1988b), p. 59. 
13GATT (1991) Vol. I, pp. 244-48. 
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Table I. Percan.tage Cov8ragre of Iaport L:l.censiJJg Restrietians in Indcllesia, 
1986-90 
Kid-1986 ll»-1987 ll»-1988 Barly-1990 
CCCN/HS itema 32 22 16 17 
IIP)rt valU81S fl 25 21 17 
Dolle8tic product.ia'l 41 38 29 28 
- mm.afacturing 68 58 ,s 38 
- agriculture 5' 53 41 "° 
- m.n:1ng am a1nera1a 0 0 0 0 
Source: can Trade Polley Review 1991: Indonesia, Vol. I, p. 86. 
Table 11. na scructu.re of the lnclonedan Tariff Since 1983 
1983·15 1985• 1988 .. 1989• 
Average r.riff llatea (per cent)• 37.3 27.0 24.0 27.0 
U..ipc.4 
lletpce4 
• hy dollllatic production' 29.0 19.0 u.o 19.0 
• by illport value 22.0 u.o 14.S 12.0 
Index of 41aper•lon (percentage 
points) 61.5 107.1 90.0 92.7 
• Following the ref on pac.kage of larch 1915 • 
Following the r:efora ,.ck.age of Rovellber 1911, 
c the HI incrocluced on 1 January 1919. 
Folloviq the nfora package of Bay 1990. 
e Including hlporcant 1urcbar1•• where applica'ble. 
f aa .. d 011 a •aple of 1.200 tariff podeiou. 
SCNrca: CA'rT Trade Policy Review 1991: lndonada. Vol. I, p. 62. 
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B!»-1990 
1, 
15 
25 
33 
38 
0 
199()11 
22.2 
16.1 
10.0 
89.0 
Table Ill. Structure of Import Du.ty Tariff l1fore and After Nay 1990 
la fora 
I11porc duty carlff 
0 • 10 
15 • 20 
2S .. 30 
3S • 40 
45 • 60 
> 60 
To cal 
Total m••t pf ta[lff tttv 
Before Kay '90 Afcer Nay '90 
2956 2901 
1036 1116 
1431 1706 
447 214 
1505 88 
103 74 
7431 7176 
Source: CATT Trade Policy l1vi1v 1991: Indone1la, Vol. II, p. 2S. 
III, Trade Liberalization: The Sequencing and Speed of Reform. 
Deregulation and liberalization of the Indonesian economy has followed a 
long-run, piecemeal process. Economic reform emerged as a byproduct of the 
political reform that followed the failed 1965 coup. The first permanent major 
reform in the process was the liberalization of the capital account in 1971. 
Attempts during this period to permanently liberalize the current account however 
failed. The next major economic reform program did not begin until 1982, sparked 
by the onset of the oil crisis which fueled public concern over the future of the 
economy. These reform measures focused on the financial sector of the Indonesian 
economy. It is the general consensus that this round of reforms was begun in the 
financial sector because the political opposition to reform was weakest in this 
area. After financial sector reforms were implemented, it became clear that 
7 
reform effort would be futile if deregulation of the real (production) sector of 
the economy did not follow . 14 In 1985, reform and deregulation of the real 
sector began. In 1986, liberalization of the current account began. The effect 
was encouraging, as non-oil exports expanded rapidly, sending a signal that the 
economy responded favorably to the reform measures. 
The success of the reform measures allowed the proponents of change to gain 
greater influence over economic policy when the 5th Development Cabinet took 
office in March of 1988. The new cabinet promptly began another round of reform 
measures focusing first on the financial sector of the economy. The government 
first deregulated the banking system in October of 1988, and then allowed the 
establishment of private securities markets in December of 1988. Government 
officials, following the successful pattern of reform set in the mid 1980's, then 
implemented additional reforms in the real and international sectors of the 
economy. 
In conclusion, the lessons learned from Indonesia's experience with 
economic reform suggests a gradual approach to deregulation and trade 
liberalization, focusing on liberalizing the capital account first. Next, 
reforms in the financial, production and international sectors of the economy, 
should commence in the sector which has the greatest ability to adjust in the 
shortest period of time. Deregulation should proceed in steps to avoid excess 
stress on the economy. In the Indonesian case, reform is an ongoing process that 
has evolved over the last ten years. 
14GATT (1991), Vol I, p. 4. 
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IV. The Economic Im.pact of Deregulation and Trade Liberalization on the 
Indonesian Economy 
The value (in constant US dollars) of Indonesia's non-oil exports doubled 
in the 1985-89 period. Non-oil export growth was led by the industrial sector, 
which has experienced an annual growth rate trend of 34. 4%. This explosion in 
non-oil exports has increased the share of non-oil exports in the total value of 
exports from 31% to 61% (see table IV). The importance of the timing of the 
reforms becomes evident when one realizes that the non-oil export boom has offset 
the steep decline in the value of oil and gas exports. Without the reforms, the 
average annual real GDP growth rate of 5. 7% experienced in the 1986-89 period 
would have been reduced and probably would have been closer to the 1.4% growth 
rate experienced in 1975-84 period.is 
15For a discussion of this issue see Soesastro (1989). 
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1989 was still biased in favor of import competing non-oil manufacturing. As a 
percentage of value, NTB protection allotted to the non-oil export and import 
competing manufacturing in 1989 was 12. 78% and 38. 06% respectively (see table V). 
Average ERP for the non-oil manufacturing sector also continues to be high 
relative to the other sectors of the economy. However, average ERP has declined 
from 73.2% in 1987 to 63. 6% in 1989 to 60% in 1990. The ERP rate for the import 
competing sector declined from 66% in 1971 to 44. 4% in 1989. For the export 
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Table v, terceatap coverage of sector •rodactioa by l'l'I in 1181. 
•J.cult..n 
K1n1ng 
All 11aa11factuift9 
Jroa,,,oil lluufactuing 
All 'h:adelblH 
· co.erave of 
Isao£Si ,1,1D1in1 
39.91 
.CM 
29.56 
ll.06 
21.11 
lollrcer 1fJmll9• (ltll), p. 121, 
Ccwer• of 
IJrDDE3i B11t,ii:iiLDDI 
18.17 
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17.51 
12. '78 
21.21 
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,, ... 
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sector, the ERP rate increased from -llX in 1971 to -6.4X in 1989. 16 For all 
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12X in 1990 (see table VI). 
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,. 12, 
16 GATT (1991), Vbl. I, p. 190. 
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Indonesian ERP rat.es in table VI reveal that protection is not evenly 
applied across all sectors of the economy. The disparity in ERP rates among 
sectors has decreased, however, under the new trade regime. Nevertheless, the 
current level of disparity is sufficient to distort the allocation of productive 
resources within and between sectors. The non-oil manufacturing sector remains 
protected at the expense of the agricultural sector, and the exporting sector is 
penalized in favor of the import competing sector. Despite the continued 
commercial policy distortions, the Indonesian government has placed the economy 
on a non-oil export industrial growth path based firmly on the fundamental 
principle of free trade. However, the real sector distortion resulting from 
errant policy prescription, represents a serious impediment to the government's 
policy objective of improving Indonesia's international competitiveness. 17 
V. Summary 
Deregulation and trade liberalization in the 1980s have enabled the 
replacement of the import substitution development strategy with one of export 
led growth. Indonesia's new trade regime has spurred export growth in all 
sectors of the economy and assisted in increasing the average annual real GDP 
growth rate above the depressed 1975-84 average. Commercial policy distortions 
continue under the new trade regime, but they are gradually being reduced. The 
greatest progress has been in the area of tarrification. 
The resurgence of the Indonesian economy suggests that the recent reforms 
are working. However, the domestic production distortions produced by uneven ERP 
between and within sectors of the Indonesian economy will retard progress toward 
international competitiveness by impairing efficient resource allocation within 
and between sectors of the economy. The success of the current reforms suggests 
17A negative ERP implies production is in effect being taxed. 
12 
that it is vital to Indonesia's long-run economic goals that deregulation 
continues in the real sector of the economy. 
13 
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